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Abstract
Studies of riskless choice in both cognitive
(Stevenson, 1986) and behavioral paradigms (Chung &
Herrnstein, 1967) have found that subjects prefer
temporally delayed losses and temporally advanced
gains.

Analogously, studies of risky choice have found

that subjects prefer risky losses and certain gains
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).

Because probability is

conceptually identical to the inverse of delay, it was
recently suggested that these findings were
descriptions of the same choice process
Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel, 1986).
of the present investigation.

(Rachlin,

There were two goals

The first was to

replicate and extend, through the use of a withinsubjects design, the finding that subjects prefer
delayed gains and immediate losses.

The second was to

test the applicability of the prospect theory value
function in a choice context involving temporally
delayed financial options.

Subjects showed strong

preferences for immediate gains and delayed losses, but
there was not support for the prospect theory value
function in a riskless context involving temporal
delays.
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Framing Effects in Riskless Decisions:
Discounting of Temporally Delayed Gains and Losses
Temporal aspects of decision making have been
understudied despite the omnipresent nature of time.
Individuals make important decisions everyday that
include a temporal dimension.

For example, a person

may deposit $1000 into a low interest bank account or
choose to invest the money in a higher yield CD that
does not mature for six months.

College students may

decide between making payments on a student loan while
enrolled in classes or confronting an even larger debt
after graduation.

In both of the preceding examples,

an individual was choosing between an immediate or
delayed outcome with negligible risk; yet, behavioral
decision theory provides no insights as to how we are
to understand and predict these types of riskless
choices.
This void in research on riskless choice involving
delayed outcomes may be attributed to the lack of a
theoretical mechanism to drive empirical
investigations.

To date, riskless decision making has

invariably been studied with structural models? that
is, researchers have been concerned with the structure
of judgments rather than choice behavior per se
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(Abelson & Levi, 1985).

However, a structural

framework cannot yield a complete understanding of
riskless choice because judgment is neither necessary
nor sufficient for choice (Einhorn & Hogarth, 1981).
Indeed, Billings and Scherer (1988) reported that a
popular structural model, policy capturing (Slovic &
Lichtenstein, 1971), did not provide a good description
of actual choice behavior.
A recent paper, however, provides a theoretical
structure for making choice predictions in some
riskless contexts.

Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, & Frankel

(1986) suggest that the psychophysical functions stated
in prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) may apply
to choices involving temporal delays.

Although

prospect theory is a model of risky choice, it may be
extended to riskless choice with temporal delays
because probability is conceptually related to delay.
In a repeated gamble, for example, an increase in the
probability of a payoff is associated with a decrease
in the delay to the payoff.
There is some support for a prospect theory
explanation of riskless choice, although the three
published investigations were all repeated gambles
experiments conducted under the behavioral research
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paradigm (e.g., Rachlin et al., 1986).

If prospect

theory and the matching law are indeed describing the
same choice behavior, then there should be
correspondence between prospect theory and experiments
on choice with delayed outcomes conducted under the
cognitive research paradigm.
Although a few studies have been conducted under
the cognitive paradigm favored by behavioral decision
researchers (e.g., Stevenson, 1986), no study has
employed a design that permits a test of prospect
theory's value function in a riskless context with
delayed outcomes.

To date, riskless choice

investigations have employed between-subjects designs
with respect to outcome type.

By treating outcome type

(i.e., gain or loss) as a within-subjects variable,
this thesis provides an empirical test of the fit of
prospect theory's value function in a riskless decision
context with temporal delays.
Choice with Delayed Outcomes
Historical Perspective
The effect of temporally delayed outcomes on
behavior was widely studied by learning researchers
following the publication of Hull's (1932) goal
gradient hypothesis.

Hull's work was taken up by his
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student, Kenneth Spence, who proposed that learning
involving delayed reinforcers occured through the
presence of secondary reinforcers (Spence, 1947).

The

empirical work engendered by Hull (193 2) and Spence
(1947) was plagued by its confinement to animal
studies.

Any studies that did use human subjects were

limited to the effect of feedback delay on motor
learning (Renner, 1964).
In the 1960's, personality researchers became
interested in childrens' ability to delay rewards.
Mischel and Metzner (1962) utilized psychoanalytic
theory of personality development to predict that older
children, having developed a reality-based secondary
process, would be better able to delay gratification.
Later, Mischel and Grusec (1967) utilized Rotter's
(1954) expectancy value theory to hypothesize that
delayed outcomes were associated with an implicit risk.
Preferences for Delaved Outcomes
From an economic standpoint, it is always rational
to choose more immediate gains over delayed gains
because failure to do so represents opportunity costs
(Yates & Watts, 1975).

For example, money in the bank

now is worth more than money in the bank a year from
now because of the interest that may be earned.

It is
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also rational, in an inflationary economy, to defer
debt payment because the loss, represented by
commodities foregone, decreases with time (Yates &
Watts, 1975).

Methodologically sound research within

both personality and learning paradigms has shown that
people (and other animals) prefer advanced gains or
rewards and delayed losses or punishments.
Personality Studies
A number of individual and situational variables
have been identified as covariates of delay of
gratification.

Mischel found that a preference for

larger, delayed rewards was significantly correlated
with need for achievement (Mischel, 1961a), a father in
the home (Mischel, 1961b), social responsibility
(Mischel, 1961c), age (Mischel & Metzner, 1962), and
intelligence (Mischel & Metzner, 1962).

In addition,

the length of the delay interval was negatively
correlated with a preference for delayed gratification
(Mischel & Metzner, 1962).
Preferences for rewards and punishers.

Mischel

followed his original studies with investigations of
preferences for delayed rewarding and aversive events.
Mischel and Grusec (1967) found that children were more
likely to choose immediate rewards as the delay to an
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alternative reward increased.

Surprisingly, choice of

punishment was independent of delay.

To explain their

results, Mischel and Grusec (1967) stated that delayed
rewards were associated with greater risk and were
avoided.

In a later publication, Mischel, Grusec, &

Masters (1969) concluded that waiting for aversive
outcomes was, in itself, aversive (Mischel, Grusec, &
Masters, 19 69).

As stated by Yates and Watts (1975),

"It is as if the person faced with an unpleasant chore
concludes,

'Well, I might as well get it over with and

stop worrying about it” (p. 296).
To support their position, Mischel, Grusec, and
Masters (1969) had adults and children choose between
rewards and punishments of equal objective value that
differed only in terms of the delay of their
occurrence.

As hypothesized, the subjective value of a

reward decreased as delay increased.

Delay had no

influence on the subjective value of punishments for
children, but delay consistently decreased the
subjective value of punishments for adults.

In other

words, adults preferred immediate punishments.
Yates and Watts (1975), however, criticized the
Mischel et. al. (1969) study on procedural grounds.
They pointed out that while subjects were indeed
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choosing between delayed aversive outcomes,
participation in experiments was required for
successful completion of a university course.

Thus,

the rewards for participating in the study (e.g.,
successful course completion) may have outweighed the
aversive outcomes.

In a replication that attempted to

remove these procedural obstacles, Yates and Watts
(1975) found that subjects were evenly split in their
preferences for advanced or deferred aversive
consequences.

Yates and Watts (1975) concluded that

their results generally supported a preference for
delayed aversive outcomes because subjects that chose
to advance may not have separated outcome from
participation compensation.
Discounting of delaved outcomes.

If delay of

reinforcement is associated with an implicit risk, then
a ratio discounting function should describe choice
with temporally delayed alternatives (Ortendahl &
Sjoberg, 1979; Stevenson, 1986).

This model is

specified as
p = sn/st
where P is the psychological evaluation of the
prospect, Sm is the subjective scale value for
magnitude, and St is the subjective scale value for
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time.

A ratio discounting function indicates that

temporally delayed outcomes are evaluated in proportion
to the magnitude of the outcome.

Therefore, ratio

discounting reduces the subjective value of delayed
gains and the aversiveness of delayed losses
(Stevenson, 1986).
In contrast, if delay of negative outcomes is also
aversive, as suggested by Mischel, Grusec, and Masters
(1969), then a subtractive discounting function should
describe choice (Ortendahl & Sjoberg, 1979; Stevenson,
1986).

A subtractive model is specified as
p = Sm - St,

such that discounting is independent of outcome
magnitude.

Therefore, subtractive discounting reduces

the subjective value of delayed gains and increases the
aversiveness of delayed losses (Stevenson, 1986).
Ortendahl and Sjoberg (1979) tested the fit of
ratio and subtractive discounting functions to choices
involving delayed outcomes.

They found that different

response measures tended to fit different functions.
The ratio discounting model tended to fit best when
magnitude estimates were elicited, while the
subtractive model was the best fit when a rating of
favorableness was used as the response measure
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(Ortendahl & Sjoberg, 1979).

Definitive conclusions

were not forthcoming, however, as the results may have
been due to a non-linear relation between the observed
and modeled values.
Stevenson (1986) conducted a more definitive
investigation of decisions with delayed outcomes.

She

tested the ratio and subtractive discounting functions
in four experiments by collecting ratings on investment
options from undergraduates.

In the first experiment,

financial decisions that varied in terms of the amount
of risk (i.e., probability), delay, and magnitude were
presented to undergraduates.

A multiplicative

combination (i.e., ratio) of the variables accounted
for 99.07% of the variance in subjects' decisions.
Stevenson (1986) then sought to determine whether
the multiplicative relation held when the risky
component was dropped from the decision problem.

She

found that a ratio discounting function described
choice for riskless investments with a delayed gain,
but subjective scale values differed from the risky
experiment (experiment 1).

First, subjective scale

values for the amount of return were higher when there
was a component of risk.

Second, the psychophysical

function for time was negatively accelerated for
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riskless investments? for example, the subjective
difference between one month and two months is larger
than the subjective difference between 24 months and 25
months.

It will be recalled that the psychophysical

function for time was linear when there was a component
of risk.
To determine whether these differences between
risky and riskless experiments were due to the task or
the different subject samples, Stevenson (1986) did a
within-subjects analysis using both risky and riskless
investments.

All subjects rated the risky investments

from experiment one and the riskless investments in
experiment two.

The results from this experiment

replicated those of the previous two experiments
indicating that subjective scale differences were due
to task rather than subject differences.
In the fourth and final experiment, Stevenson
(1986) studied riskless decisions with delayed losses.
She found, consistent with experiment two involving
delayed gains, that a ratio discounting function
described subjects' decisions.

A temporal delay

reduced the aversiveness of the investment loss.
Therefore, Stevenson (1986) found converging evidence
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for the ratio discounting model using both rewarding
and aversive outcomes.
Conclusions
A number of conclusions can be drawn from studies
on preferences for delayed outcomes.

As first

suggested by Rotter (1954), delayed outcomes are
associated with an implicit risk.

The conception of

delay as risky is supported by a ratio discounting
function for time (Stevenson, 1986).

This function

reduces the value of gains and the aversiveness of
losses.

The effect of time, however, is a negatively

accelerating function of real time (Chung & Herrnstein,
1967; Ortendahl & Sjoberg, 1979; Stevenson, 1986).

In

other words, the psychophysical difference between 3
months and 6 months is larger than the psychophysical
difference between 21 and 24 months.
Consistent with the ratio discounting function,
people generally prefer immediate gains

(Kahneman &

Snell, 1990; Mischel & Grusec, 1967; Stevenson, 1986)
and delayed losses (Stevenson, 1986; Yates & Watts,
1975).

However, this conclusion is based only on

between-subjects tests.

While Stevenson (1986) was

prudent to use a within-subjects design to investigate
decisions under risky and riskless circumstances, she
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was remiss in using a between-subjects design to
investigate preferences for gains and losses.

With a

between-subjects design it is impossible to know
whether group differences are due to the variable
manipulation (i.e., gain or loss) or to subject
characteristics.

This criticism is particularly cogent

given the Yates and Watts (1975) finding that half of
their subjects preferred advanced losses— a finding
that is antithetical to Stevenson's (1986) conclusion.
An additional problem with the use of a betweensubjects design is the inability to compare
psychophysical functions for magnitude.

While

Stevenson (1986) states that a ratio discounting
function describes choice for both gains and losses,
the psychophysical value of magnitude cannot be
compared for gains and losses despite considerable
evidence in the decision literature that these two
functions differ (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).

A within-

subjects treatment of outcome type (gain vs. loss) is
the ideal design for a comparison of the value function
for gains and losses.
A Learning Model of Delayed Outcomes
It comes as no surprise that a ratio discounting
function describes choice for delayed outcomes.
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Beginning with the work of Herrnstein (1961), learning
researchers developed a multiplicative model to
describe choice for differing values of reinforcer
magnitude, rate, and delay.

The model, known as the

matching law, is identical to a ratio discounting
function except that it also considers prior
reinforcement history (i.e., rate).
The Matching Law
The matching law states that the relative
frequency of responding on an alternative matches the
relative frequency of reinforcement for that
alternative (Herrnstein, 1961, 1970).

The law also

states that responding will match the relative
magnitude of reinforcement and the reciprocal of the
delay.

The following equation, known as the

generalized matching law (Baum, 1974), has proven to be
highly predictive of animal choice:
B1
B2

A1 SA
A2

R1 SR
R2

D2 SD
D1

where B is the rate of responding for a given time
interval on an alternative, A is the amount or
magnitude of reinforcement delivered over the interval,
R is the rate of reinforcement over the interval, and D
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is the delay of reinforcement.

The exponents represent

the organism's sensitivity to the variables.
The matching law was first demonstrated in an
experiment with pigeons (Herrnstein, 1961).

The

pigeons were given the choice of pecking at two keys,
both of which reinforced the response on variable
interval schedules.

Herrnstein (1961) found that the

percentage of responses on a key equaled the relative
percentage of reinforcers obtained from the key.
Chung and Herrnstein (1967) were the first to show
that relative frequency of responding matched the
relative immediacy of reinforcement.

Pigeons decreased

the rate of responding (i.e., pecking) on a key from
.82 to .15 as the delay increased from 1 to 30 seconds.
In addition, the response functions became less curved
with increasing delays.
Subsequent to Herrnstein (1961), numerous
researchers reported data confirming the matching law
(Herrnstein, 1970).

Matching was found when there were

three response alternatives rather than two (Reynolds,
1963), when the reinforcers differed in magnitude
rather than rate (Catania, 1963; Neuringer, 1967), when
the response was standing on either side of an
experimental chamber (Baum & Rachlin, 1969), and when
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"yes" responses were plotted against the frequency or
magnitude of reinforcement in signal detection studies
with humans (Nevin, 1969).

In fact, Herrnstein (1970)

notes that matching is consistently found as long as
responding and reinforcements are qualitatively equal.
For example, it is unlikely that matching will be found
if one of the response alternatives requires more work,
or if one of the reinforcers is a preferred food
(Herrnstein, 1970).
While pigeons are the subject of choice in
matching law experiments, the equation has been
demonstrated to adequately describe human choice as
well.

McDowell

(1981) showed that a derivative of the

matching law could account for 99% of the variance in
the rate of self-injurious scratching.

Piecre and

Epling (1983) found that thirteen of sixteen studies of
human responding on interval schedules conformed to the
matching law.
The Matching Law and Irrational Choice
The matching law shows, as one of its interesting
predictions, the tendency for organisms to be
temporally myopic in decision making (Herrnstein,
1990).

Animals, including humans, overwhelmingly show

a preference for small, immediate rewards over larger,
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delayed rewards.

When animals act in this manner they

are said to act impulsively (Herrnstein, 1990).
Unlike the Freudian and expectancy theories which
form the basis of personality research on delayed
outcomes, the matching law mathematically specifies
this pervasive temporal myopia.

The exponents for

sensitivity to amount (SA ) and sensitivity to delay
(SD) represent the degree of discounting (Rachlin et
al., 1986).
The mere discounting of deferred consequences is
perfectly rational; the banker knows that money today
is more valuable than money tomorrow because of the
interest that may be earned.

The matching law shows,

however, that discounting fits a hyperbolic function.
That is, animals downgrade the rate of discounting with
increasing delays.

As Herrnstein (1990, p. 359) points

out, if discounting is rational, then the rate of
discounting should remain fixed:

"Fifteen percent a

week is 15% a week, now or next year, in the theory of
rational choice."
This irrational method of discounting, caused by a
negatively accelerating psychophysical function for
time, yields some interesting preference reversals in
choice.

Consider the following example from Schwartz
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and Lacey (1982).

A hungry pigeon is given the choice

of pecking a green key or a red key.

Pecks at the

green key result in four seconds of access to food
after a four second delay.

Pecks at the red key result

in two seconds of access to food with no delay.

As

predicted by the matching equation, the pigeon will
select (i.e., peck) the red key approximately 95% of
the time.

In other words, the pigeon acts impulsively

by choosing the smaller, more immediate reward.
The preference reversal comes when the pigeons are
presented with two white keys.

Fifteen pecks at either

key (FR15) cause a 10 second delay.

If the left, white

key is selected, the red and green keys are presented
after the 10 second delay.

Again, pecks at the red key

result in two seconds of immediate food access while
pecks at the green key result in four seconds of food
access after a four second delay.

If the right, white

key is pecked only the green key (4 s access, 4 s
delay) is presented after the 10 second delay.

In

accord with the matching law, the pigeon will choose to
peck at the right, white key approximately 60% of the
time.

By selecting the key that results in the larger,

delayed reward the pigeon has, in effect, delayed
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gratification.

The downgrading in the rate of temporal

discounting results in a preference reversal.
There is nothing in the matching law to suggest
that discounting for gains should be different from
discounting for losses.

A change in the rate of

discounting for losses relative to gains would require
a theoretical justification for changing sensitivity to
amount (SA ) (Rachlin et al.# 1986).

Although some

theories have been proposed (cf. Herrnstein, 1990),
none have received wide support (Rachlin et al.# 1986).
There is, however, descriptive justification for such a
change.

The value function for prospect theory

(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), a theory of risky choice,
differs for gains and losses.
Prospect Theory
The Evidence for Rational Choice
When choosing among different degrees of risk, a
rational decision maker will consider only objective
probabilities and values.

The prescriptive formulation

of rational choice, expected utility theory (Friedman &
Savage, 1948), ignores subjective evaluations of risk.
Instead, expected utility theory prescribes axioms
necessary for rational choice.

The descriptive

viability of two of those axioms, invariance and
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dominance, will be considered here.

Then, a

descriptive theory of risky choice will be reviewed for
insights into decision makers' treatment of gains and
losses.
The invariance axiom.

One requirement to be met

by the rational decision maker is that of invariance.
This requires that the preference order of choice
should not change as a result of the way in which the
options are described.

As simple as the criterion of

invariance may seem, Tversky and Kahneman (1981) report
that it is consistently violated.

Consider the

following problem from Kahneman and Tversky (1984)

(p.

343) :
Problem 1 (N=152): Imagine that the U.S. is
preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian
disease, which is expected to kill 600 people.
Two alternative programs to combat the disease
have been proposed.

Assume that the exact

scientific estimates of the consequences of the
programs are as follows:
If Program A is adopted 200 people will be
saved.

(72%)

If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third
probability that 600 people will be saved and a
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two-thirds probability that no people will be
saved.

(28%)

Which of the two programs would you favor?
Problem 2 (N=155): If Program C is adopted, 4 00
people will die.

(22%)

If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third
probability that nobody will die and a two-thirds
probability that 600 people will die.

(78%)

Note that the options in problem 1 and problem 2
are identical in real terms, and differ only with
respect to the way in which the outcomes are described.
When the outcomes are described in positive terms
(lives saved), as in problem 1, subjects significantly
favor the risk averse option.

When the same outcomes

are described in negative terms (deaths), as in problem
2, subjects are risk seeking.

Kahneman and Tversky

(1984) report that subjects still wish to select the
same alternatives even after they have been confronted
with their irrationality.
The dominance axiom.

Rational choice also

requires that the decision maker meet the criterion of
dominance.

Dominance mandates that if choice A is at

least as good as choice B in every respect and better
than choice B in at least one respect, then A should be
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preferred.

However, evidence suggests that the

dominance axiom is also frequently violated.

Consider

the following problem from Tversky and Kahneman (1981)
Problem 3 (N=150):

Imagine that you face the

following pair of concurrent decisions.

First

examine both decisions, then indicate the options
you prefer.
Decision (i).

Choose between:

A.

a sure gain of $240 (84%)

B.

25% chance to gain $1000, and
75% chance to gain nothing (16%)

Decision (ii).

Choose between:

A.

a sure loss of $750 (13%)

B.

75% chance to lose $1000, and
25% chance to lose nothing (87%)

The majority of respondents were risk averse in
decision (i), a problem framed as gains, even though
the subjective expected utility is higher for option B
(i.e., $250 versus $240 for option A).

Yet these same

respondents became risk seekers in a problem framed as
losses.
The violation of invariance and dominance is
induced by simply changing the description of the
problem or the problem "frame” (Tversky & Kahneman,
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1981).

Kahneman and Tversky (1984) conclude, "In their

stubborn appeal, framing effects resemble perceptual
illusions more than computational errors" (p. 343).
This gives rise to the reflection effect (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979).

That is, choice from negative

prospects mirrors choice from corresponding positive
prospects.

The reflection effect is manifested as risk

seeking of choices framed in terms of losses and risk
avoidance of choices framed as gains (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Prospect Theory's Value and Weighting Functions
Two characteristics of the human decision maker
contribute to the reflection effect.

The first is an

S-shaped value function that is concave for gains and
convex for losses.

For example, the subjective

difference between $10 and $20 is perceived as greater
than the subjective difference between $110 and $120
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).

In addition, the value

function is steeper for losses than for gains which
leads to a robust loss aversion effect.

As stated by

Tversky and Kahneman (1981), "The displeasure
associated with losing a sum of money is generally
greater than the pleasure associated with winning the
same amount..."(p.454).
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The second characteristic that contributes to the
framing effect is the weighting of probabilities.

Low

probabilities are overweighted, and moderate and high
probabilities are underweighted.

In addition, certain

outcomes are overweighted relative to probable
outcomes.

This phenomenon, labeled the certainty

effect, means that certain gains will be highly
attractive and certain losses highly aversive.
Research Investigations of Framing
The framing effect described by Tversky and
Kahneman (1981) is robust and is evinced by
sophisticated and naive respondents alike (Kahneman &
Tversky, 1984).

Although research on framing effects

is neither voluminous nor unequivocal, the findings
generally support risk avoidance of gains and risk
seeking of losses.

A review of these studies and their

findings follows.
Risk seeking of losses and risk aversion of gains
were demonstrated in gambles with complete and
incomplete information in a variety of tasks devised by
Levin and his colleagues (Levin, Johnson, Russo, &
Deldin, 1985; Levin, Johnson, Deldin, Carstens,
Cressey, & Davis, 1986) .

Specifically, it was found

that subjects were more likely to accept gambles framed
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in terms of probability of winning than probability of
losing.

When probability information was missing

("amount to be won” only) there was no effect for the
frame.

A further examination by Levin et al.

(1986)

revealed the locus of the framing effect to be in the
decision weight associated with the probability.

In

other words, the problem frame appears to affect the
subjective likelihood of winning or losing (Levin et
al., 1986).
Decision frames have also been implicated in
escalation of committment to a failing course of action
(Northcraft & Neale, 1986).

According to Northcraft

and Neale (1986), the decision maker faced with the
dilemma of pumping more money into a failing investment
may consider the decision as a choice between a certain
loss and a low probability of a gain or a high
probability of an even greater loss.

Because decision

makers are risk seeking of losses and overestimate low
probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), it is
expected that persistence in the failing course would
occur.

Northcraft and Neale (1986) obtained results

consistent with this hypothesis.

They also found that

increasing the salience of opportunity costs decreased
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persistence by rendering the certain loss less averse
(Northcraft & Neale, 1986).
Not only may task characteristics produce a
framing effect, but research supports a framing effect
for role characteristics as well (Neale, Huber, &
Northcraft, 1987).

In sales negotiations, buyers may

focus on the loss of money, while sellers may focus on
dollar gain.

Neale et al. (1987) found, in support of

their hypothesis, that negotiator role framed the
context and resulted in biased decisions.
The preference for risky alternatives may also be
influenced by decision frames when groups make
decisions (Schurr, 1987).

Negotiating teams consisting

of Masters of Business Administration (MBA) students
selected more risky purchase alternatives when they
were induced to think of losses as opposed to gains
(Schurr, 1987).

These results extend the findings of

Tversky and Kahneman (1981) because the focus is on
degree of risk taking rather than on risk seeking or
aversion per se (Schurr, 1987).
The limits of information frames were tested by
Levin, Schnittjer, and Thee (1988) who examined social
and personal and moral decisions.

They found that

framing the incidence of cheating among college
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students (65% cheated or 35% never cheated) affected
the perceived incidence of cheating, but the frame had
no effect on whether the subjects would report a
cheater or cheat themselves.

However, framing the

success of a medical technique (50% success rate or 50%
failure rate) affected the perceived effectiveness of
the technique and the likelihood that the technique
would be recommended to a friend and family member.
This result is consistent with the finding that
individuals are more likely to choose risky medical
options framed positively (Wilson, Kaplan, &
Schneiderman, 1987).

Levin et al. attribute the

difference obtained between the two decisions (i.e.,
cheating and medical technique) in their study to the
amount of attention subjects must pay to the scenario
to make an informed judgment in the medical technique
decision.
Elliott and Achibald (1989) suggested that a
weakness in framing research is that the frames are
imposed on the subjects by the experimenter.

In their

studies, the choice outcomes were worded in a way such
that subjects would impose their own frame.

Results

were consistent with the prospect theory prediction.
Subjects who viewed the problem in terms of gains
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avoided risk, whereas subjects who viewed the problem
in terms of losses were risk seeking.
A study by Fagley and Miller (1987) called into
question the robustness of the framing effect.

In a

decision problem concerning cancer treatments, most of
the MBA students selected the risk averse option
regardless of frame (lives saved versus deaths).
Because the MBA subjects in the study had exposure to
the concept of expected value, a replication was
performed using graduate students in education.
Framing effects consistent with prospect theory were
obtained with the education students, but the
proportion of subjects selecting the risk seeking
option in the negative frame was significantly lower
than the proportions reported by Tversky and Kahneman
(1981).
One major problem with Kahneman and Tversky's
(1979) demonstration of reflection is that preference
reversals were measured across subjects.

As Hershey

and Shoemaker (1980) note, a between-subjects design
showing risk aversion for gains with one group of
subjects and risk seeking for losses with another group
of subjects does not measure individual preference
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reversals.

Individual reversals may only be measured

utilizing a within-subjects design.
Hershey and Shoemaker (1980) examined individual
and group preferences in three separate experiments.
In two of the experiments, preference reversals were
inconsistent for both groups and individuals.

In the

third experiment, which had a very large sample size
(n=2080), individual preference reversals consistent
with prospect theory occurred in significantly more
than 50% of the subjects for all problems.

While

reflection consistent with prospect theory was the most
prevalent across all three experiments, Hershey and
Shoemaker (1980) conclude that reflection is most
likely to occur when prospects involve small amounts,
extreme probabilities, or very large amounts.
Schneider and Lopes (1986) also examined the
reflection effect both between and within subjects.
Their study was unique, however, in that subjects were
classified according to risk style (i.e., risk-averse
or risk-seeking) and multi-outcome lotteries were used.
Reflection for all subjects was irregular except for
lotteries that were riskless (i.e., some amount would
be won or lost).

For both risk-averse and risk-seeking
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subjects, riskless lotteries were preferred for gains
but not for losses (Schneider & Lopes, 1986).
Cohen, Jaffray, and Said (1987) used a sample
(n=134) of economics and computer science majors who
made binary choices for gains and losses over a period
of ten weeks.

The choices involved large sums, and

subjects were told that at least one payment would be
made.

They found that only 41% of their subjects

behaved in accord with the reflection effect.
Moreover, there was no correlation between attitudes on
the gain side and attitudes on the loss side.

Subjects

also appeared to be insensitive to probabilities when
losses were involved.
The Cohen et al. (1987) study appears to supply
stronger evidence in opposition to the prospect theory
value function, but there is reason to doubt the
strength of their conclusions.

First, their subjects,

economics and computer science majors, had some
background in probability theory.

Second, the study

was completed over a span of 10 weeks.

It is likely

that any subject who persisted in the study for 10
weeks had some interest in the topic under examination.
It is not unreasonable to assume that the subjects
discussed their choices among themselves.

Third, there
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is a special concern that the sample consisted, at
least partially, of economics majors.

Prospect theory

was first published by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in
Econometrica. one of the leading economics journals.
Conclusions
As was stated in the introduction, the research
findings on generally support the framing effect,
although the effect is not as robust as first reported
by Tversky and Kahneman (1981).

Reflection consistent

with prospect theory seems most likely to occur when
prospects involve very small or large amounts, when
there are extreme probabilities, and when the prospect
is riskless (i.e., some amount is certain to be won or
lost).

Any true test of the reflection effect must

also be conducted utilizing a within-subjects design.
A Comparison of Prospect Theory and the Matching Law
Rachlin, Logue, Gibbon, and Frankel (1986)
published a paper in which Kahneman and Tversky's
(1979) prospect theory was compared with Herrnstein's
(1961) matching law.

The paper is a seminal work in

that it bridges the gap between the main cognitive and
behavioral theories of choice.
Rachlin et al.

(1986) argue that the two models of

choice, prospect theory and the matching law, are
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conceptually similar because of the correspondence
between delay and probability.

That is, probability

may be viewed as the inverse of delay (Mazur, 1985;
Rachlin, Castrogiovanni, & Cross, 1987; Rotter, 1954).
As an example, if subjects were confronted with
repeated choices between a gamble with a .5 chance of
$10 and .25 chance of $20, the subject could expect a
payoff every two choices for the .5 probability and
every four choices for the .25 probability.
Because probability and the inverse of delay are
conceptually similar, there is convergence between the
findings in cognitive and behavioral studies.

The

finding in behavioral studies that animals sharply
discount delayed positive reinforcement (e.g., Chung &
Herrnstein, 1967) corresponds to Kahneman and Tversky's
(1979) finding of risk aversion for gains.

Conversely,

the finding in behavioral studies that animals prefer
delayed aversive stimuli (e.g., Deluty, Whitehouse,
Mellitz, & Hineline, 1983) corresponds to Kahneman and
Tversky's finding of risk seeking for losses.
Probability as Delay in Repeated Gambles
Rachlin et a l . (1986) empirically demonstrated how
probabilities function as delays to reinforcement.
Their subjects were presented with two spinners and
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were asked to choose one.

The $100 spinner was called

"the sure thing" and had a 17/18 chance of winning
associated with it.

The $250 spinner was the risky

gamble which initially had a 7/18 chance of winning
associated with it.

A titration procedure was used

such that if subjects selected the sure thing on one
trial, the risky option was made more attractive by
increasing the odds of winning by 1/18.

Similarly, if

subjects selected the risky option, it was made less
attractive by decreasing the odds of winning by 1/18.
Presumably, the titration procedure would serve to keep
both options equally attractive.

For one group of

subjects the experiment was conducted as quickly as
possible.

A second group of subjects was required to

wait 1.5 minutes between gambles.

Results showed that

long intervals between gambles resulted in risk averse
choices, whereas short intervals between gambles
resulted in risky choices.

Thus, the long delays

produced choices for near certain outcomes which may be
seen as a form of impulsiveness.
Rachlin, Castrogiovanni, and Cross (1987) used a
two-stage choice procedure to demonstrate that
impulsiveness could be used to induce commitment to a
gamble.

They showed that when probability of advancing
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to the second stage of a gamble (where money was
available) was low, undergraduates committed to a
chance to win a large, low probability award.

However,

when probability of advancing to the second stage was
high, subjects preferred to commit to a gamble that
allowed a choice between a small, high probability
reward and a large, low probability award.

When faced

with this choice in the second stage, subjects
significantly preferred the small, high probability
reward.

Their behavior was much like the pigeons that

chose to peck at red and green keys:

When the delay to

reward choice is long (i.e., low probability), a large,
delayed (i.e., large, low probability) reward is
preferred.

When the delay to choice is brief (i.e.,

high probability), a small, immediate (i.e., small,
high probability) reward is preferred.
The Rachlin et a l . (1986) study was replicated by
Silberberg, Murray, Christensen, & Asano (1988), but a
confound in the study was detected.

Silberberg et al.

noted that subjects who experienced a short interval
between gambles may have expected more trials, and thus
may have implicitly perceived that they had less to
loose on each gamble.

To control this potential

confound, both long and short interval conditions were
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restricted to 10 gambles.

Under this restriction,

there was no difference in risky choice between the two
groups, suggesting that potential income affects risky
choice.

This explanation was tested directly by

informing subjects that they had been given $10 or
$10,000 before the repeated gambles had begun.

Under

these conditions, the high income group was
significantly more likely to select the risky gamble.
The repeated gambles experiments described above
provide some evidence that probability and delay are
conceptually similar.

The Silberberg et al.

(1988)

study suggests that income, either implicitly or
explicitly stated, affects the value function for
gains.

Although the confound they identify has

intuitive appeal, it seems likely that the results they
report were due to experimenter demand, particularly
when subjects were told that they had been given
$10,000.

Recall that the Rachlin, Castrogiovanni, and

Cross (1987) study demonstrated convergence with animal
studies of the matching law.

Presumably, Silberberg

and his colleagues would provide an account of a
pigeon's preference for smaller, temporally advanced
food rewards that refers to the pigeon's implicit
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expectation of a greater opportunity to eat under these
conditions.
Conclusions
Rachiin's demonstration of convergence between
cognitive and behavioral explanations of choice may, if
valid, lead to a unification of these fields.

Although

the empirical evidence seems to demonstrate that risk
is associated with delay, there is no evidence that the
value functions obtained under conditions of risk are
related to the value functions obtained under riskless
conditions involving a delay.

There is evidence that

the reflection effect predicted by prospect theory is
more likely to occur when there is a riskless component
to choice (Schneider & Lopes, 1986); however, there has
not been an empirical test of the prospect theory value
function in a riskless context.
The Proposed Investigation
Experiments on delayed rewards and punishers
support a discounting function in which delayed
outcomes are evaluated in proportion to the magnitude
of the return (Ortendahl & Sjoberg, 1979; Stevenson,
1986).

A ratio discounting model implies that delay is

treated as a risk; that is, temporal delay reduces the
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value of gains and the aversiveness of losses
(Stevenson, 1986).

Therefore, a ratio discounting

function predicts that individuals will prefer
immediate gains and delayed losses.2
The matching law (Herrnstein, 1961), like a ratio
discounting function, also states that delay influences
choice through a multiplicative relationship.
Herrnstein (1990) points out that the rate of
discounting declines with time.

Ortendahl and Sjoberg

(1979) and Stevenson (1986) also found that the effect
of time is a negatively accelerated function of real
time.
There have not been any studies of individual
preferences for delayed gains and losses with outcome
type treated as a within-subjects variable.

Stevenson

(1986) found support for a ratio discounting function
with both gains and losses, but the two experiments
used different samples.

Thus, the proposed

investigation would be the first within-subjects
comparison of individual preferences for both gains and
losses.
In addition, there is not an accepted theoretical
rationale offered by proponents of a ratio discounting
function or matching law as to how a person's
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discounting of gains should compare to the discounting
of losses.

Theoreticians have suggested, however, that

the matching law and prospect theory (a theory of risky
choice) are conceptually similar (Rachlin et al.,
1986).

Specifically, probability in prospect theory is

equivalent to the inverse of delay in the matching law.
If the matching law and prospect theory simply
explain the same phenomenon with different paradigmatic
approaches, then the psychophysical values for delayed
gains and losses should correspond to the prospect
theory value function.

The prospect theory value

function is concave for gains and convex for losses,
and it is steeper for losses than for gains.
Translated to choice, this means that individuals are
risk-averse for gains but risk-seeking for losses.

The

steeper curve for losses also contributes to a robust
loss aversion effect.

This would be expected to lead

to a steeper discounting rate for delayed losses
relative to delayed gains.

In other words, the outcome

frame should influence the rate of discounting.
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Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 ,

A ratio discounting function will

describe individual choice for both gains and losses.
(a)

Immediate gains will be preferred to delayed
gains.

(b)

Delayed losses will be preferred to immediate
losses.

Hypothesis 2 .

Larger, delayed gains will be

preferred if the advanced, smaller gain is temporally
removed.
Hypothesis 3 .

Preferences for delayed losses will

be stronger than preferences for immediate gains.
Stevenson (198 6) found, using a between-subjects
design, that a ratio discounting function described
choice for gains and losses.

Parts "a" and "b" of

Hypothesis 1 represent an attempt to replicate and
extend Stevenson's (1986) finding.

This investigation

improves upon Stevenson's study in two ways.

First,

outcome type (gain or loss) is a within-subjects
variable in the present investigation.

This is an

important distinction as it permits a test of the ratio
discounting function for both gains and losses without
the potential confounding effects of subject
differences.

Second, both binary preferences and
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preference ratings serve as dependent variables in the
present investigation.

Stevenson relied solely on

preference ratings in her investigation, a design
which lacks external validity for the study of choice
behavior.
Numerous researchers have reported a negatively
accelerating psychophysical function for time (Chung &
Herrnstein, 1967; Herrnstein, 1990; Ortendahl &
Sjoberg, 1979; Stevenson, 1986).

Hypothesis 2 is an

attempt to replicate and extend that finding.

The

present investigation is the first to utilize the
cognitive paradigm with binary preference as the
dependent variable.
Hypothesis 3 is a test of the Rachlin et al.

(1986)

proposition that prospect theory should apply to
riskless choice.

Because respondents are risk seeking

in the domain of losses and risk averse in the domain
of gains, and because the value function proposed by
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) is steeper for losses, a
negative frame should result in a steeper rate of
discounting.

That is, subjects should prefer delayed

losses more than they prefer immediate gains.

To

paraphrase Kahneman & Tversky (1984, p. 342), a delayed
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loss of $X is less aversive than an immediate gain of
$X is attractive.
Method
Overview
The sample consisted of upper level accounting
majors.

The study was divided into two sessions.

In

the first session, subjects were presented with 64 twooption prospects involving delayed gains and losses.
Preference was operationalized in the first session as
binary choice which yielded nominal data.
session was conducted a week later.

The second

In this session,

subjects were presented with the same 64 two-option
prospects, with choice operationalized as a preference
rating.

After completing the problems, open-ended

questions were used to assess strategies in selecting
and rating the options.
Subjects
The subjects were upper level accounting majors
enrolled in an information systems course.

The study

was completed in two sessions, and there was some
subject mortality.

In session 1 (binary choice), 31

subjects completed the study.
(48.4%)

Of this sample, 15

were male and 16 (51.6%) were female.

ages ranged from 21 to 43 (M=28.29).

Their

In session 2
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(preference rating), 2 6 subjects completed the study.
Of this sample, 12 (46.2%) were male and 14 (53.8%)
were female.

They ranged in age from 21 to 43

(M=28.50).
Apparatus
The packet of stimulus materials contained
instructions for completion, examples, and 64 prospects
requiring a choice by the subject.
contained two options.

Each prospect

The choice was always between a

larger, temporally delayed gain (loss) and a smaller,
immediate or temporally advanced gain (loss).
Presentation of the larger, temporally delayed option
varied between option A and option B.

(Note.

For

purposes of analysis, the problems were recoded such
that option A was always the samller, immediate or
temporally advanced option.

Thus, all presentations of

methodology and results which refer to option A or
option B reflect this recoding.)

The stimulus packets

for sessions 1 and 2 appear in Appendix A and B,
respectively.
Procedure
The stimulus materials were administered following
class periods.
the study.

Two sessions were needed to complete

In the first session, subjects indicated
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their preference by circling either the letter A or the
letter B (binary choice).

The second session was

conducted a week after the first, and subjects
indicated their preference by making a rating along a
17-point scale, where 8 on the left end indicated a
strong preference for option A, 0 indicated
indifference, and 8 on the right end indicated a strong
preference for option B.

After completing the 64

prospects, open-ended questions assessed the subjects'
knowledge of temporal discounting, the strategies used
to make choices for prospects involving gains and
losses, and strategies used to make choices between
outcomes with differing delays.
Independent variables.

The four independent

variables were magnitude of the outcome, outcome type,
option A delay, and option B delay.

There were four

levels of magnitude ($100, 200, 400, and 800), two
levels of outcome type (gain and loss), two levels of
option A delay (immediate and half of option B delay),
and four levels of option B delay (4, 10, 18, and 24
months).

The magnitude of option A was held constant

at 75% of the magnitude of option B.

All four of the

independent variables were within-subjects; thus, each
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subject completed a total of 64 problems in each
session.
Dependent variables.

The two dependent variables

were binary choice and preference rating.

In the first

session, subjects indicated their preference for each
of the 64 problems by circling either the letter A or
B.

Subjects indicated their preferences in the second

session, which was conducted a week after the first, by
making a rating along a 17-point scale.
Results
The first open-ended question asked subjects to
indicate their knowledge of temporal discounting.

Only

the open-ended questions from the first session were
content-coded because the majority of subjects did not
complete these questions in the second session.

Of the

31 subjects who participated in the first session, 25
(80.6%) reported having some knowledge of discounting,
3 (9.7%) reported having no knowledge of discounting,
and 3 (9.7%) did not answer.
Results for Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated that a ratio discounting
function would describe choice for both gains and
losses.

This entailed two predictions:

(a) Immediate
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gains will be preferred to delayed gains; and (b)
Delayed losses will be prefered to immediate losses.
This hypothesis was analyzed in three ways.
First, frequency counts were made of subjects' binary
choices, and the data were analyzed using the chisquare test.

Second, preference ratings were analyzed

using a within-subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA).
Third, responses to the open-ended questions were
content coded and frequency counts were made.
Binary Choice.

There were 16 prospects in which

subjects chose between an immediate and delayed gain.
Subjects significantly preferred the smaller, immediate
gain to the larger, delayed gain for 14 of those
prospects.

There were two prospects in which subjects

showed no significant preference.

Both of these

involved relatively large magnitudes ($400 and $800)
and relatively brief delays (4 months).

These results

are presented in Table 1.
There were also 16 prospects in which subjects
chose between an immediate and delayed loss.

Subjects

significantly preferred the larger, delayed loss for
nine of those prospects.

The seven prospects for which

the delayed loss was not significantly preferred all
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Table 1
Number of Subjects Choosing Advanced and Delaved
Options. Chi Square Values, and Significance

Prospect

Advanced

Delayed

X2

100
-100
100
-100
100
-100
100
-100
100
-100
100
-100
100
-100
100
-100

4
4
4
4
10
10
10
10
18
18
18
18
24
24
24
24

75,1
-75,1
75,2
-75,2
75,1
-75,1
75,5
-75,5
75,1
-75, I
75,9
-75,9
75,1
-75,1
75, 12
-75,12

23
15
14
19
26
11
17
12
26
5
24
11
27
2
26
10

8
16
17
12
5
20
14
19
5
26
7
20
4
29
5
21

7.258
0.857
0.290
1.581
14.226
2.613
0.290
1.581
14 .226
14.226
9 .323
2.613
17.065
23.516
14 .226
3 .903

200
-200
200
-200
200
-200
200
-200
200
-200
200
-200
200
-200
200
-200

4
4
4
4
10
10
10
10
18
18
18
18
24
24
24
24

150, I
-150,I
150, 2
-150,2
150,1
-150,I
150, 5
-150,5
150,1
-150,1
150, 9
-150,9
150,1
-150,I
150,12
-150,12

21
10
17
22
25
12
21
17
26
6
25
10
26
6
24
13

10
21
14
9
6
19
10
14
5
25
6
21
5
25
7
18

3.903
3.903
0.290
5. 452
11.645
1.581
3 .903
0.290
14.226
11.645
11.645
3.903
14.226
11.645
9.323
0.806

p
**

***

** *
***
**
***
***
***
*
*
*
*
**
*
** *
**
**
*
** *
**
**
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Table 1 (continued)
Number of Subjects Choosing Advanced and Delaved
Options. Chi Square Values, and Significance

Delayed

X

Advanced

CM

Prospect
400
-400
400
-400
400
-400
400
-400
400
-400
400
-400
400
-400
400
-400

4
4
4
4
10
10
10
10
18
18
18
18
24
24
24
24

300
-300
300
-300
300
-300
300
-300
300
-300
300
-300
300
-300
300
-300

I
I
2
2
I
I
5
5
I
I
9
9
I
I
1
1

17
13
13
15
21
13
19
14
26
5
22
11
29
7
24
14

14
18
18
16
10
18
12
17
5
26
9
20
2
.24
7
17

0.290
0. 806
0.806
0.032
3 .903
0.806
1.581
0.290
14 .226
14.226
5.452
2. 613
23.516
9.323
9.323
0.290

800
-800
800
-800
800
-800
800
-800
800
-800
800
-800
800
-800
800
-800

4
4
4
4
10
10
10
10
18
18
18
18
24
24
24
24

600
-600
600
-600
600
-600
600
-600
600
-600
600
-600
600
-600
600
600

I
I
2
2
I
I
5
5
I
I
9
9
I
I
12
12

13
15
14
20
21
12
17
19
25

18
16
17
11
10
19
14
12
6
23
9
15
6
25

0. 806
0. 032
0.290
2.613
3.903
1.581
0. 290
1.581
11.645
7.258
5.452
0.032
11.645
11.645
7.258
0. 032

8

22
16
25
6
23
16

8

15

Note. *p<.05, ** p < .01, ***p<. 001 (all two-tailed)

P

if

ifitif
if * if
if

if * if
if if
if if

if

if if
if if
if

if if
if if

**
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invloved relatively brief delays.

When the delay to

the larger loss was 4 months, there was no significant
difference in preferences at three of the magnitude
levels.

The exception was the $200/$150 level; here,

the larger, delayed loss was significantly preferred.
When the delay to the larger loss was 10 months, there
was no significant difference in preferences at all
four magnitude levels.

These results are reported in

Table 1.
To assess individual preferences across gains and
losses, subjects' responses were coded into one of four
reflection types (across outcome) for each combination
of magnitude and delay

(i.e., advanced gain, advanced

loss; delayed gain, advanced loss; advanced gain,
delayed loss; and delayed gain, delayed loss).

For 58

of the 64 prospects, reflection consistent with the
prospect theory value function (i.e., advanced gain,
delayed loss) was significantly more prevalent than any
other reflection type.

For the other six prospects, no

single reflection type was significantly more prevalent
than another.

These prospects were of relatively high

magnitude (i.e., $400 or $800) and brief delay (i.e., 4
or 10 months). In addition, the advanced, smaller
option tended to be temporally removed in these
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prospects.

The single exception was the $800 in 4

months; $600 immediate prospect.

These results are

reported in Table 2.
Preference ratings.

Preference ratings were

recoded such that a rating of 8 on the right end of the
scale ("strong preference for option A") became 1, a
rating of 0 (neutral) became 9, and a rating of 8 on
the left end ("strong preference for option B") became
17.

The analysis of subjects' preference ratings

revealed a significant main effect for outcome type F
(1,25)=7. 60, p = .011.

Gains received significantly

lower ratings (M=5.95) than losses (M=10.96).
Individual t-tests for each prospect across gains and
losses were not conducted because such a large number
of analyses (32) would capitalize on chance.

However,

a visual inspection of the mean ratings reveals that
every prospect, with one exception, that was described
in terms of a loss received a higher rating (indicating
a stronger preference for the delayed option) relative
to the same prospect described as a gain.

Means and

standard deviations of preference ratings appear in
Table 3.

Figure 1 presents the preference ratings for

all prospects involving an immediate option.
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Table 2

Reflection in Individual Preferences Across Gains and
Losses of the Same Maanitude
Prospect
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
200
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
400
800
800
800
800
800
800
800
800

4
4
10
10
18
18
24
24
4
4
10
10
18
18
24
24
4
4
10
10
18
18
24
24
4
4
10
10
18
18
24
24

1
75, I
75, 2
75, I
75, 5
75, I
75, 9
75, I
75, 12
150 I
150 2
150 I
150 5
150 I
150 9
150 I
150 12
300 I
300 2
300 I
300 5
300 I
300 9
300 I
300 12
600 I
600 2
600 I
600 5
600 I
600 9
600 I
600 12

9
4
7
2
2
7
1
5
2
9
6
8
4
6
2
8
2
3
3
6
3
4
5
10
5
7
5
7
4
10
1
9

2
6
15
4
10
3
4
1
5
8
13
6
9
2
4
4
5
11
12
10
8
2
7
2
4
10
13
7
12
4
6
5
7

3

4

X2

P

14
10
19
15
24
17
26
21
19
8
19
13
22
19
24
16
15
10
18
13
23
18
24
14
8
7
16
10
21
12
24
14

2
2
1
4
2
3
3
0
2
1
0
1
3
2
1
2
3
6
0
4
3
2
0
3
8
4
3
2
2
3
1
1

9.903
13.516
24.097
13.516
45.516
15.839
57.645
32.355
24.871
9.645
24.871
9.645
35.194
22.806
46.032
14.032
15.323
6.290
24.871
5.774
40.097
19.710
47.065
10.419
1.645
5.516
12.742
7.323
30.548
6.290
46.806
11.194

**
**
***
**
** *
***
***
***
** *
*
***
*
* **
* **
** *
**
**
***
** *
** *
** *
*
**
** *
** *
*

Note. Reflection type l=advanced gain, advanced loss;
2=delayed gain, advanced loss; 3=advanced gain, delayed
loss; and 4=delayed gain, delayed loss.
Note. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001 (all two-tailed)
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Table 3

Means and Standard Deviations for Preference Ratings

Prospect

M

SD

100
-100
100
-100
100
-100
100
-100
100
-100
100
-100
100
-100
100
-100

4
4
4
4
10
10
10
10
18
18
18
18
24
24
24
24

75,1
-75,1
75,2
-75,2
75,1
-75,1
75,5
-75,5
75,1
-75,1
75,9
-75,9
75,1
-75,1
75, 12
-75,12

6.154
10.385
7.654
10.231
5.885
11.115
6.000
10.462
4.462
11.962
5.731
11.462
4 .000
12.654
5.731
10.077

5.641
6.060
5.912
6. 002
6.002
5.764
4.964
6. 107
5.331
5.930
4.904
5.874
5. 192
5.462
5. 356
6. 105

200
-200
200
-200
200
-200
200
-200
200
-200
200
-200
200
-200
200
-200

4
4
4
4
10
10
10
10
18
18
18
18
24
24
24
24

150, I
-150,I
150,2
-150,2
150,1
-150,1
150, 5
-150,5
150,1
-150,I
150,9
-150,9
150, I
-150,1
150,12
-150,12

7.692
11.654
7.885
10.346
5.423
10.962
6. 308
10.808
4.885
12.039
5. 654
10.962
4.539
12.346
5. 692
9.462

6. 329
5. 329
6. 108
5.858
5.529
5.834
5. 342
5.755
5. 187
5.956
5. 344
5.923
5. 240
5. 192
5. 312
6. 048
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Table 3 (continued)

Means and Standard Deviations for Preference Ratings

M

Prospect

SD

400
-400
400
-400
400
-400
400
-400
400
-400
400
-400
400
-400
400
-400

4
4
4
4
10
10
10
10
18
18
18
18
24
24
24
24

300
-300
300
-300
300
-300
300
-300
300
-300
300
-300
300
-300
300
-300

I
I
2
2
I
I
5
5
I
I
9
9
I
I
12
12

6.385
11.539
8.269
8.192
5.692
12.096
6. 615
10.692
4.539
12.039
5. 462
11.500
4. 346
12.077
6.500
10.385

5.967
5.559
6.521
5.973
5.432
5.489
5.550
5.843
5.101
5.560
5.117
5.975
5. 051
5.932
5.442
5.987

800
-800
800
-800
800
-800
800
-800
800
-800
800
-800
800
-800
800
-800

4
4
4
4
10
10
10
10
18
18
18
18
24
24
24
24

600
-600
600
-600
600
-600
600
-600
600
-600
600
-600
600
-600
600
600

I
I
2
2
I
I
5
5
I
I
9
9
I
I
12
12

7.039
9. 692
7.077
8.500
5.192
11.923
7.885
9.154
5.192
12.231
6.346
10.039
4 .654
12.269
5.692
11.385

6.594
5.816
6. 273
6.275
5.706
5.542
6.199
6.104
5.671
5.332
5.462
6. 309
5. 059
5.654
5. 365
5. 665
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Open-ended responses.

After making their choices

for the 64 prospects in session 1, subjects were asked
to explain any rules or strategies they used in
choosing between gains and losses.
subjects responded to the query.

Twenty-four (77.4%)
For gains, 15 (62.5%)

subjects indicated that their strategy was to choose
the immediate or more advanced option, five (20.8%)
subjects indicated that both magnitude and delay of the
options played a role in their choices, two (8.3%)
subjects indicated that they would wait to maximize
their gain, and two subjects were ambiguous in their
response.
For losses, 16 (66.7%) subjects indicated that
their strategy was to choose the delayed option.

Four

(16.7%) subjects indicated that both magnitude and
delay were considered in their choice, one (4.2%)
subject indicated that a strategy which minimized the
loss was used, and one subject responded ambiguously.
Results for Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicted that larger, delayed gains
would be preferred if the advanced, smaller gain was
temporally removed.

This result would be expected if
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the psychophysical value of time is a negatively
accelerating function of real time.
Two methods were used to test this hypothesis.
First, a chi-square test was used to analyze the binary
choice data.

Second, a within-subjects ANOVA was used

to analyze the preference ratings.

Although an open-

ended question asked about strategies used in choosing
between delays, very few subjects responded to the
query? therefore, no content-coded data will be
presented for this hypothesis.
Binary choice.

This hypothesis was not supported

by the binary choice data.

When the length of the

delay to the larger gain was four months, there was no
significant difference in subjects' preferences at all
four magnitude levels.

When the delay to the larger

gain was 10 months, there was no significant difference
in preferences at three of the magnitude levels.

The

exception was the $200/$150 level, but the difference
was opposite from the predicted direction.

When the

delay to the larger gain was 18 or 24 months, subjects
significantly preferred the smaller, advanced gain at
all magnitude levels.

Thus, for relatively lengthy

delays, subjects' preferences were opposite from the
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predicted direction.

These results are presented in

Table 1.
Preference ratings.

This hypothesis was not

supported by the preference rating data.

There was not

a significant difference in ratings when the smaller
magnitude option was immediate (M=8.53) or half the
delay of the larger magnitude option (M=8.59)
F(l,25)=0.79, p = .382.
Results for Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the preference for
delayed losses would be stronger than the preference
for immediate gains.

This follows from the value

function from prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979) which is concave for gains, convex for losses,
and steeper in the domain of losses relative to gains.
Specifically, it was predicted that the binary choice
data would show a higher percentage of subjects
choosing delayed losses than the percentage choosing
immediate gains.

Similarly, it was expected that the

preference rating data would indicate a stronger
preference for delayed losses relative to immediate
gains.
Binary choice.

Although the data cannnot be

submitted to a statistical analysis because it violates
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the chi square assumption of independence, a visual
inspection of the percentages reveals that the
hypothesis was not supported.

There were only three

prospects for which the percentage of subjects choosing
the delayed ioss was greater than the percentage
choosing the immediate gain, and the difference between
the percentages was small.

These were at the $100

level when the delay to the larger gain (loss) was 24
months, and the $4 00 and $800 level when the delay to
the larger gain (loss) was 4 months.

For all other

prospects, either the percentage favoring immediate
gains was slightly greater than the percentage favoring
delayed losses or there was no difference in the
percentages.

Figure 2 presents these results.

Preference ratings.

A within-subjects ANOVA was

used to analyze the preference rating data (see
Footnote 1).

Analyses revealed that preferences varied

significantly as a function of outcome type, F
(1,25)=8.30, pc.01, but the results were in the
opposite direction of the prediction.

The effect

accounted for 14% of the total variance.

Subjects'

ratings revealed a significantly stronger preference
for immediate gains (M=5.96) relative to delayed losses
(M=7.12).

Discounting

58
Figure 2 . Percentage of subjects favoring immediate
gains and delayed losses.
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Figure 2. (Cont.) Percentage of subjects favoring
immediate gains and delayed losses.
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Additional Significant Results
As the analysis of variance results presented in
Table 4 reveal, there were some significant
interactions that were not hypothesized.

Effect sizes

for each interaction were calculated assuming an
additive model.

Because none of the significant

interactions accounted for more than 1.1% of the total
variance, post hoc comparisons were not conducted.
There was a significant two-way interaction
between delay for option B and outcome which accounted
for 1.1% of the total variance.

For gains, analysis of

ratings revealed a stronger preference for the smaller
magnitude, immediate or advanced option with increasing
delays.

For losses, analysis showed a stronger

preference for the larger magnitude, delayed option
with increasing delays.

This interaction is presented

in Figure 3.
There was also a significant two-way interaction
between delay for option A and outcome which accounted
for 1.1% of the total variance.

For gains, subjects

showed a stronger preference for the smaller magnitude,
advanced option when it was immediate (M=5.38) relative
to when it was temporally removed (M=6.94).

For

losses, there was a stronger preference for the larger
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magnitude, delayed option when the smaller option was
immediate (M=11.67) relative to when it was temporally
removed (M=10.23).

This interaction is presented in

figure 4.
There was also a significant four-way interaction
between magnitude, option B delay, outcome, and option
A delay which accounted for 0.13% of the variance.
Because of the large number of factors and levels
involved (4 X 4 X 2 X 2), the interaction was
impossible to interpret.

This interaction is presented

in figure 5.

Discussion
The purpose of this study was to assess the
correspondence between cognitive and behavioral
theories of choice as suggested by Rachlin, Logue,
Gibbon, and Frankel (1986).

The unique contribution of

the study is that the prospect theory value function,
which was derived from risky choice, was examined in a
riskless context with temporal delays.

The results of

this thesis advance our understanding of prospect
theory and choice under delay.
The results support the view that delay is
associated with an implicit risk? that is, probability
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corresponds to the inverse of delay.

In general,

subjects preferred immediate gains of smaller magnitude
and delayed losses of larger magnitude.

This finding

is consistent with behavioral examinations of the
matching law which show that animals prefer immediate
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Table 4
Within-Subi ects Analysis of Variance Table for
Preference Ratinas

Source

SS

df

MS

1. Magnitude

9.94

3

3.31

.31

.818

41.46

3

13.82

1.51

.219

10430.02

1

10430.02

7. 60

.011

10.47

1

10.47

.79

.382

1X2

111.34

9

12.37

1.10

.365

1X3

38. 30

3

12.77

1. 35

.265

1X4

9.83

3

3.28

.47

.707

2X3

816.37

3

272.12

8.89

.000

2X4

5.55

3

1.85

.23

.877

3X4

714.00

1

714.00

26.55

.000

1X2X3

64.53

9

7.17

1.01

.436

1X2X4

62.82

9

6.98

.80

.612

1X3X4

27.43

3

9.15

1.13

.342

2X3X4

30.39

3

10.13

1.18

.324

169.60

9

18.84

2.01

.039

2. Delay

(B)

3. Outcome
4. Delay (A)

1X2X3X4

F

P

w2

.140

.011

.011

.001
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Figure 3 . Two-way interaction between delay for option
B and outcome type.
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Figure 4 . Two-way interaction between delay for option
A and outcome type.
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Figure 5 . Four-way interaction between magnitude,
delay for option A, delay for option B, and outcome
type.
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rewards and delayed punishments (see Rachlin et al.,
1986).

It is also consistent with cognitive

examinations of prospect theory which show that people
are risk averse with gains and risk seeking with losses
(see Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
The second hypothesis, that larger, delayed gains
would be preferred if the advanced, smaller gain was
temporally removed was not supported.

Although

numerous researchers (e.g., Ortendahl & Sjoberg, 1979;
Stevenson, 1986) have reported that the psychophysical
value of time is a negatively accelerating function of
real time, the delay to the larger gain was obviously
perceived as more aversive in this investigation even
when the smaller gain was temporally removed.
This investigation was also the first to examine
the correspondence of the prospect theory value
function in a riskless context.

No other study of

choice with delayed outcomes, in either the cognitive
or behavioral paradigms, has assessed outcome type
(i.e., gains vs. losses) utilizing a within-subjects
design.

The prospect theory value function is concave

for gains, convex for losses, and steeper for losses
than for gains.

The results of this study did not

support a corresponding value function for choices
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involving delayed outcomes.

The findings of this study

suggest that subjects' preferences for temporally
advanced gains are stronger than their preferences for
delayed losses.

This is not consistent with a value

function that is steeper in the domain of losses.
A fault of the present study is that there may
have been an undetected carryover effect to the
preference ratings given that all subjects completed
binary choices a week prior to making ratings.
Although a carryover effect is possible, subjects'
binary choices (completed in the first session) were
not congruent with the prospect theory value function.
Thus, the value function from propsect theory is not
consistent with the data even when there are no
carryover effects.

Nevertheless, any replication of

the present study should include some form of
counterbalancing for type of value elicitation (binary
choice vs. preference ratings).
The Limitations of Prospect Theory
The prospect theory value function was derived
from risky choice but it did not fit with the riskless
choices in this study even though the temporal
dimension implied risk.

This is consistent with the

lack of support the value function has obtained from
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within-subject examinations of risky choice (e.g.,
Hershey & Shoemaker, 1980).

The present study and

other methodologically sound examinations of prospect
theory indicate that there is not a single value
function that fits across all people and situational
contexts.

It is time that decision researchers moved

away from a prospect theory analysis of choice and
moved toward a person and situational analysis.
Schneider and Lopes (1986) provide a useful
framework for a person and situation analysis of
choice.

They have found that propensity for risk

taking is a good predictor of individual risky choice
across gains and losses.

Given the correspondence

between probability and delay, it seems likely that
this variable would influence choice with delayed
outcomes as well.
Another potential individual difference variable
that may predict choice in both risky contexts and
riskless contexts involving delays is age (C. R.
Millimet, personal communication, May, 1991).

An older

person may feel as if she or he cannot take risky
gambles because there is not enough time to rebound
should a loss occur.

Similarly, an older person cannot

Discounting

69
afford to make an investment that does not pay off for
a long period of time.
There are many situational constraints that may
influence both risky and riskless choices.

A set of

variables that is of interest to organizational
researchers is personal and organizational goals.

If

an individual or organization aspired to maximize the
gain from a prospect, it would make sense to be willing
to take more risk or to wait a longer period of time
for the outcome.

The converse would be true if there

was a stated goal to minimize losses.
Overcoming Paradigmatic Limitations
A recent article by Baruch Fischoff (1991)
highlights the false assumptions that can be made by
strictly adhering to a single paradigmatic view of
value elicitation.

Fischoff places paradigms of value

elicitation along a continuum from the philosophy of
articulated values at one end to the philosophy of
basic values at the other.

The philosophy of

articulated values holds that people have well-formed
values and can provide researchers with reponses that
accurately reflect these values.

The philosophy of

basic values holds that people have well-formed
opinions on only a limited number of issues.
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Fischoff (1991) notes that prospect theory
operates from a partial perspective that is somewhere
in-between articulated and basic values.

Although a

paradigm of value elicitation is useful in that it
provides a framework for interpreting results, there is
an inherent flaw in adhering to a single pardigmatic
view.

"...it is in the nature of paradigms that they

provide clearer indications of relative rather than
absolute success.

That is, they show which

applications of the set of accepted methods work
better, rather than whether the set as a whole is up to
the job" (Fischoff, 1991, p. 837).
With its partial perspectives of value
elicitation, prospect theory straddles the center of
the continuum of value elicitation paradigms.

Prospect

theory must be concerned with misunderstood questions
that would prevent well articulated values from being
expressed, but it must also be concerned with
overinterpreting elicited responses from subjects who
do not possess well-formed opinions (Fischoff, 1991).
The major problem with prospect theory is that it
is a descriptive theory in search of a value function
that is not robust.

The question of how well a subject

can articulate opinions about the value of goods is not
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likely to be settled.

However, research that addresses

where values are well articulated would be very
beneficial as well as informative (Fischoff, 1991).
Conclusion
This investigation advances our knowledge in the
understudied area of choices involving delays.

It

reveals that these types of choices are much too
complex to be understood by a single value function.
There is a tendency for subjects to prefer immediate
gains and delayed losses, but this tendency seems to be
stronger at lower magnitude levels and it is not
consistent across all subjects.

It would be fruitful

to move from a perspective of modeling this tendency
with value functions to understanding what factors
affect individual's choices with delayed outcomes.
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Footnotes
1. To analyze this hypothesis, the data were recoded
such that a rating of 1 in the domain of gains
indicated a strong preference for the immediate or
advanced option, and a rating of 1 in the domain of
losses indicated a strong preference for the delayed
option.

Appendix A
The purpose of this investigation is to examine your
preferences for hypothetical financial gains and losses.

In this

part of the study, you will be asked to choose one of two
financial outcomes in each problem.

There are a total of 64

problems, and at least one of the financial outcomes in each
problem is delayed (expressed in months).

Please make only one

choice for each problem by clearly circling either the letter "A"
or the letter MB".
Even though the financial outcomes in this study are
hypothetical, we are interested in what you would choose if a
real amount of money was to be gained or lost.

Therefore, we ask

that you behave as if the outcomes stated in each problem are
real, and that you behave as if you will gain or loose the amount
of money expressed by the option you choose.

We also ask that

you make a choice for each problem even if you are not sure which
option you prefer.

Please consider the problems in order and do

not turn back to previous pages after they have been completed.
Feel free to take all of the time you need to make your choices
and to ask the experimenter to clarify anything for you.

SUBJECT #

The following is an example of a problem you might see where
the choice is between two financial losses:
Option A

Option B

Lose $500 in 8 months

Lose $425 immediately

I prefer to lose (circle one):

A

B

In this sample problem you would be choosing between an immediate
loss of $425 or a loss of $500 in eight months.

If it helps, you

might think of problems that involve losses as credit plan
options for the payment of debts.
Here is a problem you might see where the choice is between
two financial gains:
Option A
Gain $425 in 3 months

Option B
Gain $500 in 6 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

B

In this sample problem you would be choosing between a gain of
$425 in three months or a larger gain of $500 in six months.

It

may help to think of problems that involve gains as options in
returns on an investment.
Please be sure that you know whether you are choosing between
gains or losses for each problem and how many months it will take
to gain or lose the money —

This is VERY important!

Your participation in this study is greatly appreciated!

Option A

Gain $100 in 4 months

Option B

Gain $75 immediately

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

Option A
Gain $400 in 24 months

Option B
Gain $300 in 12 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

B

Option A
Lose $600 in 5 months

Option B
Lose $800 in 10 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

A

Option A
Lose $2 00 in 18 months

B

B

Option B
Lose $150 immediately

I prefer to lose (circle one):

A

B

Option A

Lose $300 in 2 months

Option B

Lose $400 in 4 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

A

Option A
Gain $150 in 5 months

Option B
Gain $200 in 10 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

Option A
Lose $7 5 immediately

B

Option B
Lose $100 in 24 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

A

Option A
Gain $800 in 18 months

B

B

Option B
Gain $600 immediately

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

B

9.

Option A

Gain $300 in 5 months

Option B

Gain $400 in 10 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

10.

Option A
Lose $2 00 in 24 months

Option A
Gain $75 immediately

Lose $150 in 12 months

Option A
Gain $800 in 24 months

A

B

Option B
Gain $100 in 10 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

12.

B

Option B

I prefer to lose (circle one):

11.

A

A

B

Option B
Gain $600 in 12 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

B

13.

Option A

Lose $75 immediately
I prefer to lose

14.

Option A
Gain $150 immediately

Option B

Lose $100 in 18 months
(circle one):

Option A
Lose $8 00 in 4 months

Gain $200 in 4 months

Option A
Lose $4 00 in 18 months

A

B

Option B
Lose $600 immediately

I prefer to lose (circle one):

16.

B

Option B

I prefer to gain (circle one):

15.

A

A

B

Option B
Lose $300 immediately

I prefer to lose (circle one):

A

B

17.

Option A

Lose $150 in 9 months

Option B

Lose $200 in 18 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

18.

Option A
Gain $300 immediately

Option A
Lose $800 in 10 months

Gain $400 in 24 months

Option A
Gain $75 in 2 months

A

B

Option B
Lose $600 immediately

I prefer to lose (circle one):

20.

B

Option B

I prefer to gain (circle one):

19.

A

A

B

Option B
Gain $100 in 4 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

B

21.

Option A

Gain $600 in 9 months

Option B

Gain $800 in 18 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

22.

Option A
Lose $100 in 24 months

Option A
Gain $2 00 in 10 months

Lose $75 in 12 months

Option A
Lose $4 00 in 4 months

A

B

Option B
Gain $150 immediately

I prefer to gain (circle one):

24.

B

Option B

I prefer to lose (circle one):

23.

A

A

B

Option B
Lose $3 00 immediately

I prefer to lose (circle one):

A

B

25.

Option A

Gain $600 immediately

Option B

Gain $800 in 24 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

26.

Option A
Gain $100 in 10 months

A

Option B
Gain $75 in 5 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

27.

Option A
Lose $150 immediately

Option A
Gain $400 in 10 months

A

B

Option B
Lose $200 in 24 months

I prefer to lose (circle one)s

28.

B

A

B

Option B
Gain $300 immediately

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

B

29.

Option A

Lose $2 00 in 4 months

Option B

Lose $150 in 2 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

30.

Option A
Lose $600 in 2 months

Option A
Gain $200 in 4 months

Lose $800 in 4 months

Option A
Lose $100 in 18 months

A

B

Option B
Gain $150 in 2 months

I prefer to gain (circle one)s

32 .

B

Option B

I prefer to lose (circle one):

31.

A

A

B

Option B
Lose $75 in 9 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

A

B

33.

Option A

Gain $4 00 in 4 months

Option B

Gain $3 00 immediately

I prefer to gain (circle one):

34.

Option A
Lose $600 in 12 months

Option A
Lose $150 immediately

Lose $800 in 24 months

Option A
Gain $7 5 in 9 months

A

B

Option B
Lose $200 in 10 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

36.

B

Option B

I prefer to lose (circle one):

35.

A

A

B

Option B
Gain $100

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

in 18months
B

37.

Option A

Gain $800 in 4 months

Option B

Gain $600 in 2 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

38.

Option A
Lose $75 immediately

A

Option B
Lose $100 in 10 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

39.

Option A
Lose $4 00 in 2 4 months

Option A
Gain $200 in 18 months

A

B

Option B
Lose $3 00 in 12 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

40.

B

A

B

Option B
Gain $150 in 9 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

B

41.

Option

A

Gain $600 immediately
I prefer to gain

42.

Option A
Lose $100 in 4 months

Option B

Gain $800 in 10 months
(circle one):

A

Option B
Lose $75 immediately

I prefer to lose (circle one):

43.

Option A
Gain $150 in 12 months

Option A
Lose $800 in 18 months

A

B

Option B
Gain $200 in 24 months

I prefer to gain (circle one)s

44.

B

A

B

Option B
Lose $600 in 9 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

A

B

45.

Option A

Gain $75 in 12 months

Option B

Gain $100 in 24 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

46.

Option A
Lose $300 immediately

A

Option B
Lose $400 in 10 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

47.

Option A
Gain $400 in 18 months

A

Option A
Lose $3 00 in 9 months

B

Option B
Gain $300 in 9 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

48.

B

A

B

Option B
Lose $400 in 18 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

A

B

49.

Option A

Gain $100 in 18 months

Option B

Gain $75 immediately

I prefer to gain (circle one):

50.

Option A
Lose $2 00 in 10 months

Option A
Lose $800 in 24 months

Lose $150 in 5 months

Option A
Lose $150 immediately

A

B

Option B
Lose $600 immediately

I prefer to lose (circle one):

52.

B

Option B

I prefer to lose (circle one):

51.

A

A

B

Option B
Lose $200 in 4 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

A

B

53.

Option A

Lose $300 immediately

Option B

Lose $400 in 24 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

54.

Option A
Gain $200 in 18 months

Option A
Lose $100 in 10 months

Gain $150 immediately

Option A
Gain $600 immediately

A

B

Option B
Lose $7 5 in 5 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

56.

B

Option B

I prefer to gain (circle one):

55.

A

A

B

Option B
Gain $800 in 4 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

B

57.

Option A

Lose $400 in 10 months

Option B

Lose $300 in 5 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

58.

Option A
Gain $200 in 24 months

Option A
Lose $75 in 2 months

Gain $150 immediately

Option A
Gain $800 in 10 months

A

B

Option B
Lose $100 in 4 months

I prefer to lose (circle one):

60.

B

Option B

I prefer to gain (circle one):

59.

A

A

B

Option B
Gain $600 in 5 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

B

61.

Option A

Gain $400 in 18 months

Option B

Gain $300 immediately

I prefer to gain (circle one):

62.

Option A
Gain $300 in 2 months

Option A
Lose $800 in 18 months

Gain $400 in 4 months

Option A
Gain $75 immediately

A

B

Option B
Lose $600 immediately

I prefer to lose (circle one):

64.

B

Option B

I prefer to gain (circle one):

63.

A

A

B

Option B
Gain $100 in 24 months

I prefer to gain (circle one):

A

B

For the following problems, select one of the options in each
pair by clearly circling either the letter A or B.
7.

80% chance to win $4,000
A

8.

20% chance to win $15,000
A

9.

90% chance to win $2,000
A

10.

10% chance to win $16,000
A

11.

50% chance to win $5,000

$3,200 for sure
B

$3,000 for sure
B

$1,800 for sure
B

$1,600 for sure
B

$2,500 for sure

Final Questions
Male _____

Female _____

Age _____
Do you have any knowledge of discounting in accounting or
finance? (If yes, please elaborate.)

Please explain any rules or strategies you used in choosing
between gains in this study.

Please explain any rules or strategies you used in choosing
between losses in this study.

Please explain any rules or strategies you used in choosing
between different delays.

